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Cost Performance of Public Infrastructure Projects: The 
Nemesis and Nirvana of Change-Orders 
 
Abstract: The cost performance of a wide range of public sector infrastructure projects completed 
by a contractor are analyzed and discussed. Change-orders after a contract to construct an asset 
was signed were, on average, found to contribute to a 23.75% increase in project costs. A positive 
association between an increase in change orders and the contractor’s margin was identified. 
Taxpayers pay for this additional cost, while those charged with constructing assets are rewarded 
with an increase in their margins. As the public sector embraces an era of digitization, there is a 
need to improve the integration of design and construction activities and engender collaboration 
to ensure assets can be delivered cost effectively and future-proofed.  The research paper provides 
empirical evidence for the public sector to re-consider the processes that are used to deliver their 
infrastructure assets so as to reduce the propensity for cost overruns and enable future-proofing to 
occur.  
 
Keywords: Change-orders, public sector, cost performance, infrastructure, procurement. 
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Introduction 
Cost overruns have been and continue to be the bête noire for the public sector in Australia (Love 
et al., 2015a; Love et al., 2017a;b); this also is a problem worldwide (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002; 
Cantarelli et al., 2012; Odeck, 2014). Cantarelli et al. (2012) has revealed that the size of the cost 
overrun that can materialize (i.e., from the decision to build to a project’s practical completion) 
varies by geographical region. Similarly, Flyvbjerg (2008) has declared that specific types of 
transportation infrastructure projects (e.g., rail, roads, and bridges) display similar cost overrun 
profiles, irrespective of their geographical location, the technology used, and contractual method 
employed in their delivery.   
 
A significant problem that has been consistently identified as a contributor to increasing an asset’s 
construction costs is the quality of the contractual documentation that is produced (e.g., Jarkas, 
2014). The errors and omissions that often materialize in contract documentation, for example, 
typically do not come to light until construction has commenced, and can therefore result in 
change-orders occurring (i.e. additional work and/or rework). Fundamentally, change-orders lead 
to unintended consequences; in their basic form this is an increase in project costs for the public-
sector client, but for contractors it can result in increased margins. There has been a tendency to 
overlook this dynamic, as data is not readily available due to commercial confidentiality. A 
change-order is essentially a client’s written instruction (or their representative) to a contractor, 
issued after the execution of a construction contract, which authorizes a change to the work being 
undertaken and contract time and/or amount.  
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In this paper, the cost performance of a wide range of infrastructure projects (n=67) completed 
between 2011 to 2014 are analyzed and discussed to illustrate the prevailing problem that confronts 
the public sector when it opts to use traditional (design-bid-construct) procurement methods or 
variants thereof to deliver their assets.   The research presented in this paper provides much needed 
empirical evidence for the public sector to re-consider the processes that are used to deliver their 
infrastructure assets so as to reduce the propensity of cost overruns occurring and ensure better 
value-for-money (VfM) to the taxpayer. 
 
Cost Performance 
For the public sector, managing the cost performance of their portfolio of projects is essential to 
ensure taxpayers are being provided with an asset that is able to deliver VfM; this is a critical 
metric, as it quantifies the cost efficiency of the work that is completed. Cost performance is 
generally defined as the value of the work completed compared to the actual cost of progress made 
on the project (Baccarini and Love, 2014). For the public sector, the ability to reliably predict the 
final cost of construction of an infrastructure asset whilst ensuring it does not experience a cost 
overrun is vital for the planning and resourcing of other projects or those in the pipeline. In this 
case, a cost overrun is defined as the ratio of the actual final costs of the project to the estimate 
made at full funds authorization measured in escalation-adjusted terms. Thus, a cost overrun is 
treated as the margin between the authorized initial project cost and the real final costs incurred 
after adjusting for expenditures due to escalation terms.  
 
Deloitte Access Economics (2014), for example, have revealed that on average, completed 
economic infrastructure projects in Australia experience a cost overrun of 6.5% in excess of their 
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initial estimate. Moreover, projects in excess of AU$1 billion have been found to experience an 
average cost overrun of 12.7%. Higher values have been reported in Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) who 
examined the cost overruns of 258 transportation projects and revealed a mean cost overrun of 
32.8% from the budget established at the decision to build to the completion of construction. 
Contrastingly, Love (2002) found that cost overruns from the final tender sum to completion of 
construction for a sample 169 projects to possess a mean cost overrun of 12.6%. Terrill and 
Danks’s (2016) comprehensive analysis of 836 transportation infrastructure projects valued in 
excess of AU$20 million revealed that 90% of the total increase in costs incurred in Australia can 
be explained by 17% of projects that exceed their cost by more than 50%. In addition, Terrill and 
Danks (2016) revealed that 24% of projects exceeded the cost announced by the incumbent 
Government, and 9% were delivered under their publicized budget.   
 
The disparity between the reported magnitude of cost overruns that have been experienced arises 
due to the ‘point of reference’ from where they are determined in a project’s development process 
(Siemiatycki, 2009; Love et al. 2016). A review of the literature reveals cost overruns have been 
typically determined between the: (1) initial forecasted budget (i.e. base estimate) and actual 
construction cost (Cantarelli et al. 2012); (2) detailed planning stage and actual construction costs 
(Odeck, 2004); and (3) establishment of a contract value and actual construction costs (Love et al., 
2015b).  
 
These differences, in part, arise as there is a tendency for public infrastructure projects to engage 
in a lengthy ‘definition’ period after the decision-to-build and a base estimate has been established. 
Needless to say, such a protracted period can result in projects being susceptible to experiencing 
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change-orders, which can lead to cost increases being incurred (Allen Consulting and the 
University of Melbourne, 2007). With this in mind, it is suggested that it is misleading to make 
direct comparisons between the base estimate at the time of the decision-to-build and actual 
construction costs, as the estimate that is initially prepared is typically based upon a conceptual 
design. As noted in Figure 1, the accuracy of an estimate improves as more information becomes 
available (e.g., scope is defined and users’ requirements are identified). In Figure 1, Ashworth’s 
(2008) percentage range for each type of estimate that is produced during the design development 
phase of a project is presented (p.251).  
 
 
Figure 1. Traditional cost scenario for infrastructure projects 
 
At this juncture, it is important to mention that the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS) 
under the auspices of the ‘New Rules of Measurement’ advocate that all estimates are expressed 
as a single figure (RICS, 2012). The use of such a precise figure is failing the basic tests of validity: 
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accuracy and precision (Newton, 2012). The inadequacies of the traditional estimating process are 
camouflaged by the use of deterministic percentage additions that take the form of a contingency, 
which cater for an increase in a project’s cost due to: (1) variability (i.e. random uncertainty); (2) 
risk events; and (3) unforeseeable situations (Baccarini and Love, 2014). In stark contrast to the 
deterministic approach, it has been suggested the application of a probabilistic approach to 
determining a construction cost contingency based upon empirical analysis of a wide range of 
infrastructure projects should be applied (e.g. Baccarini and Love, 2014).  
 
Generally, the construction contingency percentages applied to public infrastructure projects have 
been unable to accommodate increases in cost that are incurred. For example, Baccarini and Love 
(2014) analysis of 228 water infrastructure projects revealed that the mean percentage addition 
was 8.46% of their contract value, but the construction contingency requirement for the final cost 
was 13.58%; a shortfall in contingency in the region of 5%. The magnitude of this percentage 
addition, while evidently inaccurate, can vary with the nature of the project and the type of 
procurement method adopted. For example, in the case of a greenfield project that is being 
delivered via a traditional procurement method (e.g., Construct Only), the design and 
specifications (including drawings and Bills of Quantities (BoQ)) for a project are supposed to be 
complete at the award of a tender and thus a construction contingency between 2% and 5% is often 
provided. As a result, there is a perception that a high degree of cost certainty will ensue, but in 
reality this is fallacy, as complete drawings and BoQs are seldom available when a project goes to 
tender. As previously mentioned, they invariably contain errors and omissions, which can lead to 
change-orders and rework and increased construction costs (Love et al., 2012). 
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Brownfield projects can be considered to be higher risk ventures than greenfield sites (e.g., due to 
geotechnical uncertainties, contaminated soil and neighboring structures). Thus, in the case of 
Brownfields projects, a public sector client may opt to use a non-traditional procurement route 
(e.g. Design and Construct) and transfer the associated risks for the development to a single-entity 
as well as be provided with a Guaranteed Maximum Price, for the works. Any changes in the scope 
of work under this form of contractual arrangement, however, will require a client to pay a 
premium for any changes that are required. It is, therefore, necessary to have a sufficient 
contingency allowance in place should the need for amendments arise (De Marco et al., 2015).  
 
Explanations for Deviations in Cost Performance 
The literature is replete with explanations as to ‘how’ and ‘why’ the cost performance of public 
sector infrastructure projects deviates from their expected outturn cost (e.g., Pickrell, 1992; Bordat 
et al. 2004; Odeck, 2004; Siemiatycki, 2009; Odeck et al., 2015). According to Love et al. (2016) 
two schools of thought have emerged explaining deviations in the cost performance of 
infrastructure projects: (1) ‘Evolution Theorists’, who have suggested that cost deviations 
materialize as a result of changes in scope and definition between a project’s inception and 
completion. The Office of the Auditor General in Western Australia (2012), for example, revealed 
that changes in scope were the primary culprit that had contributed to cost overruns occurring in 
their major capital projects. Next are (2) ‘Psycho Strategists’ who have advocated that projects 
experience cost overruns due to deception, planning fallacy and unjustifiable optimism bias in 
establishing the initial cost targets (Flyvbjerg et al. 2002; Siemiatycki, 2009). According to 
Flyvbjerg (2003) those responsible for determining the budget for an infrastructure project are 
often subjected to applying Machiavelli’s formula to ensure it is given approval to proceed: costs 
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are underestimated (-), revenues are over estimated (+), environmental impacts undervalued (-) 
and development effects are overvalued (+) (p.43).  
 
Often estimators/planners only consider the information that is made available to them for the 
particular project they are involved with delivering; such a focus is referred to as having an ‘inside 
view’ (Flyvbjerg et al., 2005). In particular, Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) observed that “the 
inside view is overwhelmingly preferred in intuitive forecasting. The natural way to think about a 
problem is to bring to bear all one knows about it, with special attention to its unique features” 
(p.26). Contrastingly, an ‘outside view’ recognizes that projects of a similar nature should be used 
as a reference point when assessing a project (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993). By adopting an 
‘outside view’ Flyvbjerg (2008) suggests that a more realistic forecast of cost can be acquired and 
thereby reduce the propensity for optimism bias to arise.   
 
In theory, the proposition that has been proposed by Flyvbjerg (2008) is plausible, however, in 
practice a different reality exists (Love et al., 2016). For example, Perth Arena’s initial budget 
estimate was established based on square meter rate with reference to Melbourne Park’s Multi-
Purpose Venue (formerly known as Vodafone Stadium and with a construction cost of AU$65 
million in 2000). The initial estimate was AU$165 million, which then increased to AU$343 within 
two years, and with a final completion cost in excess of AU$550 million (Office of the Auditor 
General, 2010).  According to Love et al. (2016) both ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ views need to be 
adopted to adequately explain the causal nature of cost overruns. However, the research presented 
in this paper does not seek to explain ‘why’, but bring to the fore ‘how’ cost overruns occur by 
illustrating the direct financial consequences of poorly managed public infrastructure projects. At 
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the time a project’s contract is signed, cost certainty should be affirmed, unless a form of cost-plus 
agreement is otherwise agreed.  
 
Illustrative Case Study 
Most research studies that have examined the cost performance of infrastructure projects have 
tended to rely upon heterogeneous datasets (e.g., Flyvbjerg et al., 2002; Cantarelli et al., 2012).  
Such datasets are loosely connected and thus there is a propensity for them to possess a 
considerable amount of ‘noise’, as a morass of missing information is adequately needed to explain 
the nature of a project’s cost performance (e.g. by way of an asset owners’ aims and objectives, 
planning requirements, contractors, project teams, technologies, and contractual arrangements). 
Instead, this research sought to obtain an ameliorated understanding of the impact of change-orders 
on the public sector and contractors financial performance.  
 
To illustrate how the cost performance of infrastructure projects varies and provide an insight to 
the problem that confronts the public sector, a case study is used (Fry et al., 1999). Typically, an 
illustrative case study is used to describe an event; they utilize one or two instances to demonstrate 
the reality of a situation (e.g., change-orders and margin). In this instance, the case study provides 
a platform to demonstrate that the cost performance of public sector projects has been mismanaged.  
The case study serves to make the ‘unfamiliar, familiar’, and provide a common language for the 
nature of infrastructure projects’ cost performance. A homogenous dataset (i.e. in terms of 
processes, technologies, procedures and processes) from a contractor who completed a wide range 
of infrastructure projects between 2011 to 2014 are examined where their final accounts had been 
completed; that is, the final payment made to the contractor on completion of the works described 
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in the contract and payments owing being made at the end of the defects liability period (typically, 
6-12 months after handover). Selecting only those projects that had their final accounts completed 
enabled an accurate assessment of their cost to be determined.  No project sampled was subjected 
to open tendering, and several were delivered within a Building Information Modelling (BIM) 
environment. Individual names, locations, and the Level of Development (LOD) specification of 
projects are withheld and the data aggregated for reasons of commercial confidentially. 
 
Analysis and Findings 
Cost data from 67 completed infrastructure projects were provided, which included their 
procurement method, original contract value (OCV), final contract value, contractor’s margin, total 
of client approved change-orders, and final contractor’s margin. Table 1 provides a summary of 
the types and procurement methods for the 67 infrastructure projects that were constructed 
throughout Australia within the study period (Table 1). ‘Building’ (n=16, 24%) (e.g., hospitals, 
schools and civic assets) and ‘Rail’ (n=16, 24%) and ‘Civil’ (n=22, 33%) (i.e., miscellaneous 
works such as dam upgrades and earthworks) were the most popular types of projects that were 
constructed. A variety of procurement methods were selected by the public sector to deliver their 
assets (Table 1); 65 (44%) were traditional ‘Construct Only’ lump sum contracts and the remainder 
being non-traditional methods with the most popular form being ‘Design and Construct’, 
(n=13,19%). Tables 2 and 3 provide an overview of the cost performance parameters of projects 
and a breakdown by their type, respectively.   
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Table 1. Projects and procurement methods 
= 
Procurement Method  
 Construct 
Only 
Design 
and 
Construct 
Service 
Contract
Alliance Construction 
Management
Management 
Contracting 
EPC 
Project 
Type 
N (%) N (%) N(%) N(%) N(%) N(%) N(%) 
Rail 13(33) 2(15) 1(100) 1(100)     
Road 2(5) 1(7.5)      
Tunnel 3(7.5) 1(7.5)      
Civil 13(30) 4(30)    1(33) 3(100)
Building 10(25) 2(15)   2 (5) 2(67)  
Power  3(7.5) 1(7.5)      
Water  1(2.5) 2(15)      
Total 44 (100) 13(100) 1(100) 1(100) 2(100) 3 (100) 3(100)
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for cost performance parameters 
 
Cost Parameter Minimum   Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Original Contract 
Value (OCV) $1,851,459 $318,307,311 $48,201,497 $58,619,500 
Cost Performance -42.88% 270.93% 23.75% 48.51% 
Final Contract 
Value $3,334,068 $453,869,568 $59,501,002 $81,674,335 
Original Margin $224,496 $31,543,968 $4,431,586 $6,278,123 
Final Margin $-38,204,212 $80,188,944** $6,171,254 $14,305,630 
Client Approved 
Change-Orders $-519,141 $80,655,072 $5,107,252 $11,364,666 
 
** Specific details are suppressed due to reasons of commercial in confidence. Similarly, this applies to the location of all projects  
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Table 3. Original contract values and approved change orders 
 
 
Project 
Type  
N Total value of 
projects ($) 
OCV 
Minimum 
Value ($) 
OCV 
Maximum 
Value ($) 
Mean 
Value ($) 
Mean 
Margin (%) 
Total Client Approved 
Change Orders ($) 
Rail  16 645,736,621 1,851,459 318,307,311 40,358,538 8.76 57,710,882 
Road  2 47,145,336 8,822,453 38,322,883 23,572,668 10.48 4,290 
Tunnel  4 230,234,197 30,179,736 102,465,401 57,558,549 10.61 23,244,545 
Civil  22 1.39E+9 4,970,945 224,575,457 63,0323,333 10.17 207,114,979 
Building  16 823,883,239 2,258,943 180,049,561 51,492,702 10.41 46,791,411 
Power  4 488,534,403 4,519,860 200,825,529 12,213,350 9.89 4,185,061 
Water  3 46,936,231 4,611,781 23,396,953 15,645,410 9.60 3,134,747 
Total 67 3.23E+9 1,851,459 318,307,311 48,201,497 9.89 342,185,917 
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Cost Performance 
The value of the contracts that had been awarded by the public sector varied, though a significant 
proportion were less than AU$100 million (n=55, 82%) as denoted in Figure 2. The contract value 
of the projects ranged from approximately AU$1.8 million to AU$318 million, with a mean of 
AU$48 million (Table 2). More specifically, ‘Civil’, (43%) ‘Building’ (25%) and ‘Rail’ (20%) 
project types accounted for a majority of the contractor’s turnover from 2011 to 2014 (Table 3). 
 
 
Figure 2. Number of infrastructure projects 
 
It can be seen that the cost performance of projects ranged from -42.88% to + 270.93% of budget 
with a mean cost overrun of 23.75% as a proportion of the OCV. This finding is in stark contrast 
to Love (2002) who reported a mean cost overrun of 12.6% of the OCV, with 48% being 
attributable to change-orders and the remaining 52% being due to rework. All projects that utilized 
BIM to a minimum of LOD 300 experienced cost increases; in this instance, specific model 
elements are demonstrated as specific assemblies accurate in terms of quantity, size, shape, 
location and orientation.  
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A total of 67% (n=45) of projects incurred a cost overrun of less than 25% of the OCV and 9% 
(n=6) experienced a cost underrun. A Grubbs test was used to detect outliers from a Normal 
Distribution with the tested data being the minimum and maximum values (Grubbs, 1950). The 
result is a probability that belongs to the core population being examined. So, if the data is 
approximately normally distributed, then outliers are required to have Z-scores ± 3. Outliers 
possessing a Z-score in the range ± 2 to 3 can be considered to be ‘borderline’ outliers. As denoted 
in Figure 3, two projects were identified as being ‘borderline’ with Z-scores being between +2 and 
+3 and two outright outliers being in excess of +4. Considering these Z-scores, the ‘best fit’ 
distribution was determined. Considering the outliers that were present, a Normal Distribution was 
not deemed to be the ‘best fit’ distribution’ for the data.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Determination of outliers for cost performance 
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The ‘best fit’ probability distribution for ‘cost performance’ was examined so that probability of 
cost deviations (i.e., underruns and overrun) could be determined at the point of contract award 
(Love et al., 2013); the computation of such a distribution is both pertinent to the public sector and 
contractors as part of formulating a risk management strategy for their projects. A caveat, however, 
needs to be made here; the data’s homogeneity would likely provide a more accurate assessment 
of risk for the contractor, but could provide public sector clients with ‘ballpark’ probabilities to 
formulate future construction contingencies. ‘Underruns’ and ‘overruns’ should be separated when 
examining cost performance, but considering the limited number of projects that were below the 
agreed contract value it was decided to combine them together in this case.   
 
Using the ‘Goodness of Fit’ Kolmogorov-Smirnov (D), and Anderson-Darling (A2) tests it was 
revealed that Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) distribution with parameters k = 0.51, σ = 11.98, 
μ = 4.43 was identified as the ‘best fit’ solution for examining the cost performance for the sample 
of projects.  The Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test revealed a D statistic of 0.13 with a P-value of 
0.17. The Anderson-Darling (A-D) statistic A2 was revealed to be 5.21. The K-S test accepted the 
Null Hypothesis (i.e., H0 where it is assumed that there is no difference in parameters) for the 
sample distribution’s ‘best fit’ at the critical nominated α values of 0.2, and at 0.01 for the A-D 
test. The resulting GEV probability density function (PDF) is expressed as: 
 
݂(ݔ) = ቐ
ଵ
ఙ exp	(−(1 + ݇ݖ)
ିభೖ)(1 + ݇ݖ)ିଵିభೖ		݇ ≠ 0
ଵ
ఙ exp(−ݖ − exp(−ݖ)) 		݇ = 0
      [Eq.1] 
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where z=(x-μ)/σ, and k, σ, μ are the shape, scale, and location parameters respectively. The scale 
must be positive (sigma>0), the shape and location can take on any real value. However, the range 
of definition for the GEV distribution depends on k:  
 
1 + ݇ (ݔ − ߤ)ߪ > 0			݂݋ݎ	݇ ≠ 0	
−∞ < ݔ < +∞				݂݋ݎ	݇ = 0  
            [Eq.2] 
 
Using the GEV PDF the probability of cost overrun of 23.75% is 73% (P=0.73). The proportion 
of projects (67%) that experienced less than 25% cost overrun had a mean of 7.9%; the probability 
a project exceeds its OCV is 0.58%. 
 
The detailed financial summaries provided to the researchers by the contractor revealed that client 
change-orders contributed to the cost deviations that were subjected to public sector clients’ 
approval. Non-conformances also materialized in the projects, but the rectification costs did not 
impact the final contract value paid by the clients as these were the responsibility of the 
subcontractors and suppliers. 
 
The correlation analysis presented in Table 4 reveals that the size of a project in terms of its OCV, 
its type, and the procurement method used were not significantly related with cost performance (p 
<0.01). Studies examining the relationship between project size and the extent of cost overrun that 
is incurred remains inconclusive and has been the subject of debate (e.g., Odeck, 2004; Love et 
al., 2013). In pursuing this unresolved issue, the analysis sought to determine if there was a 
significant difference between a project’s size (i.e. OCV) and cost performance.
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Table 4. Correlations between project characteristics and cost measures 
Variable Project Type 
Procurement 
Method 
Project 
Size 
Cost 
Performance 
% 
Original 
Margin 
% Final 
Margin to 
OCV 
Project Type 1 
Procurement Method 0.11 1 
Project Size 0.06 0.21 1 
Cost Performance -0.11 0.15 -0.05 1 
% of Margin of OCV 
0.07 0.11 -0.01 0.20 1 
% of Final Margin to 
OCV 
-0.24 -0.11 -.38** .46** -0.04 1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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A one-way Analysis of the Variance (ANOVA) was used in this instance to test for differences. 
Levene’s test for homogeneity of variances was not found to be violated (p <0.05), which indicates 
the population variances for project size and cost performance were equal. Thus, there were no 
significant differences between ‘project size’ and cost performance, F (4,62) = 1.096, p <0.05). 
Furthermore, to determine whether there was a difference between procurement methods and cost 
performance, a t-test was undertaken using the categories of ‘traditional’ and ‘non-traditional’.  
 
Table 5 presents the mean and standard deviation for the cost performances for categorized 
procurement types, and the results of the t-test are presented in Table 6. At the 95% confidence 
interval, no significant difference in cost performance was experienced in projects delivered under 
the different procurement categorizations that were established. Akin with previous research it can 
be concluded that cost performance does not significantly vary with the procurement methods 
employed (e.g., Love, 2002). 
 
Table 5. Cost performance for procurement types 
 
Procurement Type N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Traditional 44 18.19 45.81 6.90 
Non-traditional 23 35.87 53.43 11.39 
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Table 6. t-test for difference between cost performance and procurement types 
 
 Levene’s 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t equality of-
Test for 
means 
     
 F 
 
Sig. T df. Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
difference
Std. error 
difference 
Lower Upper 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
0.53 0.46 -1.39 65 0.16 -17.67 12.65 -42.95 7.59 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  -1.32 36.84 0.19 -17.67 13.32 -44.67 9.31 
 
 
Change-Orders 
The mean amount of client approved change-orders that occurred in projects was approximately 
AU$5.1 million (10.6%) (Table 2). In addition, the total change-orders accounted for 11% of the 
value of the work that was undertaken by the contractor between 2011 and 2014 (Table 3). To 
determine if there was a significant difference between the change-orders and project size an 
ANOVA was undertaken. Levene’s test for homogeneity of variances was found to be violated (p 
= 0.00), which indicates the population variances for project size and cost performance were not 
equal. Significant differences between change-orders and project size were found to occur, F 
(4,62) = 5.525, p <0.01). A Tukey’s HSD post-hoc tested showed that projects with lower a OCV 
experienced smaller volumes of change-orders (p <0.05). 
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Margin 
According to the NAO (2013) there is limited available knowledge and a lack of transparency 
surrounding the margins of contractors. In contributing to this gap in knowledge, the analysis 
revealed that the contractor’s mean margin (excluding overheads) was 9.89% of the OCV. Table 
3 provides a breakdown of the mean margin allocated for each type of project, which ranged from 
8.76% to 10.61%.  
 
The lowest record margin was 3.98% of the OCV for a ‘Civil’ project that had an OCV of AU$48.4 
million and a final contract value of AU$65.9 million. However, in this project the contractor’s 
expected margin at the commencement of the works was AU$3.8 million, but declined to AU$3.2 
million (-15.57%) due to issues surrounding rework, which they were accountable for.  This 
scenario was observed in several projects, for example, an AU$64.7 million ‘Construct Only’ 
‘Civil’ project that had an expected margin of AU$2.9 million. With the client issuing scope 
changes, the final contract value was AU$61.6 million, a cost underrun of 4.06%. The contractor 
experienced a staggering loss of AU$38.2 million, which occurred due to an array of issues that 
included rework, product non-conformances and delays to works (Table 2).  Disastrous projects 
of this nature can, and more often than not, usually result in contractors being liquidated. If, 
however, as in this case, they are able to shoulder such costs, then their stock value, reputation and 
image within the public and private sectors and the general community can be adversely impacted.  
Losses in one project can be offset against gains in others that form part of a contractor’s portfolio 
of work in progress. For example, the maximum recorded final margin as noted in Table 2 was 
AU$80.18 million for a project that had an OCV in excess of AU$1 billion and incurred a cost 
increase of 7.5%. 
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The project that had the highest margin (> 30%) was a ‘Building’ project with an OCV of AU$3.38 
million, which increased by 25.76% in value to AU$4.87 million due to change-orders. In contrast 
to the aforementioned example, this project’s margin increased from an expected value of 
AU$641,608 to AU$1.37 million (114.33%).  Surprisingly, the projects with margins in excess of 
20% of their OCV varied in size, type, and location. Figure 4 identifies three ‘borderline’ and two 
‘outlier’ projects that possessed high margins. For example, a ‘Civil’ project had an OCV of $138 
million with a margin of 22.82%. Conversely, a ‘Building’ project had an OCV of AU$2.5 million 
with a margin of 28.98%.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Determination of outliers for margin 
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Considering the prevailing ‘outliers’ the ‘best fit’ distribution was computed, and can ceteris 
paribus be used to determine the likelihood of a contractor’s margin by the public sector. As above, 
the K-S and A-D ‘Goodness of Fit’ tests were undertaken. The results of the ‘Goodness of Fit’ 
tests revealed that the Wakeby distribution provided the ‘best fit’ for the dataset.  The K-S test 
revealed a D-statistic of 0.07573 with a P-value of 0.80413 and the A-D statistic A2 was revealed 
to be 0.47668 at the critical nominated α values of 0.01.   The Wakeby is a form of GEV 
distribution.  The parameters of a Wakeby, α β γ δ ξ are all continuous.  The domain for this 
distribution is expressed as , if  and ,  if  or . The 
distribution parameters for the range were α = 21.367, β = 4.5569, γ = 1.71, δ =0.45437, ξ=3.0078.   
The Wakeby distribution is defined by the quantile function (i.e. inverse CDF): 
 
       [Eq.3] 
 
The Wakeby PDF is used to determine the likelihood of a mean of 9.89% margin if applied to a 
project; in this instance, there is a 62% (P=0.62) probability that this margin would be applied. 
 
The mean margin OCV contract award for various sizes of projects can be seen in Table 7. It can 
be seen the mean margins do not significantly vary between one and another rendering the Wakeby 
distribution identified above as a basis for determining the likely margin that would be applied. 
Levene’s test for homogeneity of variances confirms this observation as it was not found to be 
violated (p <0.05), which indicates the population variances for project size and margin are equal. 
Thus, there were no significant differences between ‘project size’ and margin, F (4,62) = 3.04., p 
x≤ξ ≥δ 0>γ δγβαξ −+≤≤ x 0<δ 0=γ
( )( ) ( )( )δβ δγβαξ −−−−−−+= FFFx 1111)(
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<0.05). A significant association, however, was found to be present with the percentage increase 
of the final margin with project size, r=-038, n=67, p < 0.01, two tails and cost performance and 
r=-046, n=67, p < 0.01, two tails. It can be therefore implied that the likelihood of an increase in 
expected margin at contract decreases with smaller OCVs. In addition, the margins of a contractor 
increase as a project experiences larger cost overruns. 
 
To determine whether there was a difference between procurement methods and margin, a t-test 
was undertaken using the categories of ‘traditional’ and ‘non-traditional’. Table 8 presents the 
mean and standard deviation for the cost performances for categorized procurement types, and the 
results of the t-test are presented in Table 9. At the 95% confidence interval, no significant 
difference in margins was determined under the different procurement categorizations that were 
established.  
 
Table 7. Size and margin % of contract value 
Project Size N Mean (%) Minimum (%) Maximum 
(%) 
Std. Deviation 
$1-$20m 28 10.26 3.98 32.33 6.15 
$21-$50m 17 8.54 0.00 26.41 5.79 
$51-$100m 10 10.60 4.01 26.62 6.69 
$101-$200m 10 10.32 6.17 22.82 4.81 
>$201m 2 9.91 9.91 10.04 0.91 
Total 67 9.89 0.00 32.33 5.79 
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Table 8. Margin for procurement types 
 
Procurement Type N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Traditional 44 9.56 5.50 0.82 
Non-traditional 23 10.61 6.52 1.39 
 
 
Table 9. t-test for difference between contractor’s margin and procurement types 
 
 Levene’s 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t equality of-
Test for 
means 
     
 F 
 
Sig. T df. Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
difference
Std. error 
difference 
Lower Upper 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
0.32 0.56 -0.68 65 0.49 -1.04 1.52 -4.09 2.01 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  -0.64 36.31 0.52 -1.04 1.62 -4.32 2.24 
 
 
The dominant paradigm within the public sector assumes that differing procurement options can 
provide varying degrees of cost certainty and will influence the level of a contractor’s margin, 
which is a reflection of their risk profile; the findings presented from this illustrative case study 
suggest the contrary, and provide a basis for the public sector to better understand the unintended 
consequences of change-orders that can arise during the delivery of their assets.  The level of a 
contractor’s margin is a small component of their cost, yet having an understanding of this amount 
is important, as the balance of risk and reward can distort their behavior if they are not aligned 
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(Love et al., 2011). Thus, the balance of risk and reward is dependent upon the structure of the 
contract and how well it is managed (NAO, 2013).  
 
Discussion 
What matters most to the taxpayer is whether contracted out services can provide improved quality 
at an appropriate overall cost (NAO, 2013: p.15). Taxpayers concerns, however, are not being 
adequately addressed; evidence of this can be seen with the sheer number of public sector projects 
that have and continue to experience cost overruns. This is not to say that the public sector is 
neglecting such concerns; quite the contrary, as it is acknowledged that significant effort has been 
undertaken to redress the issues that adversely impact the delivery of infrastructure projects. After 
all public-sector employees are also taxpayers and therefore there should be a resounding 
motivation for them to ensure assets and services are delivered, operated and maintained cost 
effectively. However, despite noble intentions, there is a residing suspicion that spending other 
peoples’ money on other people absolves them from any form of accountability, which often 
results in assets not providing the VfM that was initially intended.  This case in point was originally 
highlighted by Milton Friedman (2004) who perceptively stated: “I can spend somebody else's 
money on somebody else. And if I spend somebody else's money on somebody else, I'm not 
concerned about how much it is, and I'm not concerned about what I get. And that's government”. 
 
The magnitude of change-orders that occurs in projects is troublesome and hinders public sector 
ability to cost effectively ensure the asset being delivered is ‘future proofed’; that is, resilient to 
unexpected events and adaptable to changing needs, uses or capacities. Changes during 
construction may lead to sub-optimal solutions (e.g., design, functionality, materials, running 
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costs) being incorporated into an asset’s fabric to minimize cost and meet the committed 
completion date.  
 
Irrespective of the procurement strategy adopted, change-orders were found to materialize during 
construction. An analysis of the nature of change-orders is outside the remit of this paper, but it 
was observed that changes in scope, and errors and omissions in documentation predominated. 
Such levels of change indicate that the ‘design’ process has not been effectively managed, 
irrespective of the procurement option, and the use of BIM, though as noted this was only used in 
a limited number of projects. The authors did not have access to the construction contingency of 
the public-sector clients, but a deterministic figure between 2% and 5% (Baccarini and Love 2014), 
which is often applied would have obviously been inadequate for the sampled projects. Prior to 
the commencement of construction, a contingency in excess of this value would be unacceptable 
for the public sector, as there is unequivocally a need for cost certainty. But, there remains the 
‘elephant in the room’, with no party wanting to be held accountable for contributing to the 
development and production of an incomplete scope and poor quality tender documentation. 
Naturally, contractors will submit a bid based upon the information that they have been provided 
and may opportunistically price items within the BoQ where they anticipate future changes to 
materialize to maximize their margin.  
 
In light of the status quo, cost overruns due to change-orders will continue to prevail and could 
even be exacerbated as there is a misconception that digitization of the design process enabled by 
the use of BIM will reduce errors and omissions. Simply superimposing a 21st century innovation 
such as BIM to procurement practices where contracts do not wholly support collaborative working 
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and have been essentially developed for the 20th century, will not leverage the benefits that can be 
afforded from its adoption. Thus, to mitigate change-orders, behavioral, cultural, legal and 
structural issues associated with the delivery of public sector assets need to be transformed to 
effectively accommodate the benefits that can be afforded by BIM, especially if they are to be 
future-proofed. The inclusion of contractors and asset managers in the design process is needed to 
help reduce changes using visualization and enable future-proofing to take place (Figure 5). This 
can be done by ensuring the information needed to effectively operate and maintain an asset is 
captured and provided in a usable format that is readily accessible (Figure 6).  
 
 
(a) A 3D visualization of what is to be constructed (b) Actually constructed 
  
Figure 5.  3D visualization 
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Figure 6. Centralization of asset information for operations and maintenance 
 
Considerable effort has been and continues to be made to address the aforementioned issues to 
support the digitization of assets throughout their life-cycle, particularly in the United Kingdom 
(e.g. Construction Industry Council, 2014). While such efforts provide the building blocks for 
enabling the much-needed transformational change, many public-sector agencies are still ‘sitting 
on the fence’ with regard to rolling out BIM and implementing the new procurement practices that 
are required, despite being cognizant of the problems associated with existing approaches of asset 
delivery. Indeed, this is a bold proposition, however, if the public sector is to make headway in 
ensuring that assets are delivered cost effectively, then a charter focusing on procurement reform 
needs to be initiated, managed and maintained; changes initiated in the past have been ephemeral.    
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Conclusion 
Public infrastructure projects that experience cost overruns adversely impact taxpayers. It is 
therefore imperative that they are not only delivered within budget but also continue to be of 
value into the future. Providing infrastructure that is resilient and adaptable to changing needs, 
capacities and uses should be the ultimate goal of the public sector. The path to attaining this goal 
can be derailed when change-orders (e.g., in scope) are required during construction, and can lead 
to sub-optimal assets being delivered. The taxpayer pays for this additional cost, while contractors 
are rewarded with an increase in their margins; this is the ‘elephant in the room’ within the public 
sector, which is underpinned by ‘spending somebody else's money on somebody else’.  
 
In examining the cost performance of public infrastructure projects an illustrative case study was 
undertaken. Cost information from 67 projects constructed between 2011 and 2014 were provided 
by a contracting organization. The cost overruns/underruns that were experienced were calculated 
from the contract award to when final accounts were completed. The analysis revealed that the 
cost performance of projects ranged from -42.88% to + 270.93%, with a mean cost overrun of 
23.75%. and a probability of occurring of 73%. In alignment with previous research no significant 
differences in the magnitude of cost overruns were found to exist by a project’s contract value, 
types, and procurement method. It revealed that change-orders accounted for a significant 
proportion of the cost overruns that emerged in the projects, with a mean of 10.6% as a proportion 
of the original contract value. Notably, significant differences were found to occur between a 
project’s size and change-orders; that is, those with a smaller original contract value experienced 
a smaller volume of change-orders. 
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Limited knowledge has existed about the margins that contractors apply to projects. However, the 
mean margin applied to the sample of public sector projects was revealed to be 9.89%, and the 
likelihood of such a value being applied was computed to be 62%.  The analysis revealed that the 
margin applied by the contractor did not vary with project type, its size and the procurement 
method being used to construct the asset. The analysis also demonstrated a positive association 
with an increase in change-orders and the contractor’s margin. More specifically it was found that 
contractor’s margins increase with larger cost overruns. A significant proportion of the projects 
were delivered using traditional ‘Construct Only’ and there is no incentive for contractors reduce 
change-orders as they have had no involvement in the design process. Even when the contractor 
was involved in the design process, change-orders still occurred, though their extent was unable 
to be determined.  
 
Involving the contractor as early as possible in the design process, providing incentives, and open-
book tendering are considerations that should be enacted as initial steps to mitigate change-orders. 
As the public sector embraces the era of digitization, which is being enabled by Building 
Information Modelling, the need to integrate design and construction and engender collaboration 
is imperative to ensure assets can be delivered cost effectively and future-proofed. Emphasis here 
should not necessarily be placed on the technology but ensuring information is structured in a 
standardized format, captured, openly-shared, stored and accessible so that parties can effectively 
work in a collaborative environment. The research in this paper provides invaluable empirical 
evidence, though based on a limited dataset of 67 projects, to support the need for a change to the 
way the public sector procures their assets. If change is not embraced, then cost overruns will 
continue to be a nemesis.  
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